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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 For this installment of the Recent Developments, we have chosen 
to highlight a variety of federal and state cases as well as two new 
statutes enacted in 2004 by the Florida Legislature.1 In the first case 
we cover, Missouri v. Seibert,2 the United States Supreme Court re-
fined the scope of Miranda3 and may have mandated new interroga-
tion procedures for police departments. Our coverage of the Florida 
                                                                                                                    
 1. Chris Hamilton, Seam Park, Shane Ramsey, Ty Roofner, and Jessica Slatten con-
tributed to the Recent Developments. Thanks are in order to Professor B.J. Priester for his 
assistance with this project, and we owe our continuing gratitude to Professor Charles 
Ehrhardt for his continued advice and wisdom regarding the Recent Developments. 
 2. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). 
 3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Supreme Court begins with Warner v. City of Boca Raton,4 where the 
court affirmed that the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
prevents neutral, generally applicable laws from infringing upon re-
ligious practices. This decision likely invites a substantial amount of 
future litigation, as general laws are challenged as alleged religious 
infringements. Next, Taylor v. School Board of Brevard County5 ad-
dresses the unrelated works exception to the workers compensation 
statute; although the court ultimately concluded that the “unrelated 
works” exception was not applicable in the case before it, the court 
did little to clarify when the exception would apply. Our coverage of 
Florida cases concludes with Pollock v. Florida Department of High-
way Patrol,6 where the supreme court ruled that the Highway Patrol 
does not owe the public a duty to maintain safe highways. 
 Additionally, for this Issue, we have included coverage on two 
statutes enacted in 2004 by the Florida Legislature. Each statute en-
acts an immunity from civil liability; one statute is an effective im-
plementation of immunity while the other is not. Under the amend-
ment to the Florida Good Samaritan Act,7 the Legislature extended 
civil immunity to volunteers who assist in emergency efforts, so long 
as they act as a reasonably prudent person—this, of course, is the 
same standard to which ordinary citizens are always held. Con-
versely, under section 768.37,8 the Legislature effectively immunized 
sellers and manufacturers of food from civil liability for injuries or 
disease allegedly caused by long-term consumption of foods. This is a 
legislative response to an infamous tort suit against McDonald’s; the 
efficacy of the statute makes an interesting juxtaposition with the 
amendment to the Good Samaritan Act. We hope you enjoy the Notes 
that follow. 
CRIMINAL LAW—REAFFIRMING MIRANDA—UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT HOLDS MIRANDA WARNINGS INEFFECTIVE WHEN GIVEN MID-
INTERROGATION—Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). 
 Recently, in Missouri v. Seibert,9 a plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court held Miranda10 warnings given mid-interrogation 
were ineffective, resulting in the inadmissibility of both pre- and 
post-warning statements.11 This Note first describes the factual cir-
                                                                                                                    
 4. 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004). 
 5. 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). 
 6. 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004). 
 7. FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2004). 
 8. Id. § 768.37. 
 9. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). 
 10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 11. The Seibert Court characterized Miranda as “condition[ing] the admissibility at 
trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his rights: failure to give the pre-
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cumstances and procedural history of Missouri v. Seibert. Next, the 
Note discusses Justice Souter’s plurality opinion, Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion which concurs in the 
judgment, and Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion. Finally, the 
Note discusses likely future implications of the Court’s decision.  
 Patrice Seibert was arrested in connection with the death of Don-
ald Rector, a mentally ill teenager who lived with Seibert and was 
killed when a fire destroyed Seibert’s home. Following her arrest, al-
though detained and interrogated at the police station,12 she was not 
advised of her Miranda rights until after she admitted that she in-
tended for Donald to die in the fire.13 Subsequent to her confession, a 
police officer guided her through a series of questions, and Seibert 
repeated her pre-Miranda confession.14 Seibert was charged with 
first-degree murder. At trial, she sought to suppress both her pre- 
and post-warning statements.15 
 At the suppression hearing, the interrogating officer testified that 
his “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings was in accor-
dance with a local policy that required officers to “question first, then 
give the [Miranda] warnings, and then repeat the question” until the 
suspect repeats his or her answer to the pre-warning question.16  
 At trial, the court suppressed the pre-warning admission but per-
mitted the post-warning statements—Seibert was convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder.17 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision; however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the post-warning statements, in addition to the pre-warning 
statements, should have been excluded because the officer intention-
ally withheld the necessary warnings to achieve a deliberate “end 
run” around Miranda.18 Missouri appealed, and the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.19  
                                                                                                                    
scribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally re-
quires exclusion of any statements obtained.” 124 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 12. Seibert was left alone for fifteen to twenty minutes in an interview room and then 
interrogated for thirty to forty minutes before she admitted that she intended for Donald to 
die in the fire. Id. at 2606.  
 13. After Seibert confessed, she was given a twenty-minute break and was then in-
formed of her rights under Miranda. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. This technique is known as a two-stage interrogation. See id. at 2608-09. 
 17. Id. at 2606. 
 18. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 706-07 (Mo. 2002), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004). 
 19. The D.C. Circuit indicated in United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 
1992), that a “deliberate ‘end run’ around Miranda” would be grounds for suppression. 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that Supreme Court precedent prohibits a deliberate 
“end run around Miranda.” United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
However, both the First and Ninth Circuits subsequently issued contrary decisions. See 
United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 
1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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 Justice Souter’s plurality opinion affirmed the Missouri Supreme 
Court20 but rejected Missouri’s claim that the Court’s previous deci-
sion in Oregon v. Elstad21 permits the type of “question-first” strategy 
employed in Seibert.22 Souter further explained that the facts at issue 
in Seibert are “[a]t the opposite extreme” from those in Elstad be-
cause an analysis of the facts in Seibert revealed that a question-first 
strategy undermined the purpose and effectiveness of Miranda.23 
Thus, the plurality affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court and, in so 
holding, provided that future cases must be decided in accordance 
with the above standard, looking to whether the strategy undercuts 
Miranda.  
 Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion that advocated a “sim-
ple rule” for the two-stage interrogation technique under which 
courts “should exclude the ‘fruits’[24] of the initial unwarned question-
                                                                                                                    
 20. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613. 
 21. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In Elstad, the police apprehended a young burglary suspect 
at his mother’s house. However, before being advised of his Miranda rights, the suspect 
admitted he was present at the scene of the crime. The suspect was then taken to the po-
lice station, given Miranda warnings, and interrogated. He confessed, and the Supreme 
Court held that the post-warning statements were admissible. Id. at 318. In so holding, the 
Court reasoned that “a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any 
actual coercion or other circumstances” would not render “a subsequent voluntary and in-
formed waiver . . . ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Id. at 309. Thus, even though 
“Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of 
any subsequent statement should turn . . . solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntar-
ily made.” Id. 
 22. Souter reasoned:  
 The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series of relevant facts 
that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective 
enough to accomplish their object: the completeness and detail of the questions 
and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the 
two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continu-
ity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions 
treated the second round as continuous with the first. In Elstad, it was not un-
reasonable to see the occasion for questioning at the station house as present-
ing a markedly different experience from the short conversation at home; since 
a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the station house 
questioning as a new and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings could 
have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the 
earlier admission. 
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Justice Breyer derived the “fruit” reference from the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine, which developed, and is commonly employed, within the context of the Fourth 
Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The “fruit of the poison-
ous tree” doctrine provides that “evidence otherwise admissible but discovered as a result 
of an earlier violation is excluded as tainted [to deter] future violations.” Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 
at 2610 n.4. Importantly, however, the Supreme Court has rejected the doctrine’s applica-
tion within the context of a Miranda case. See id. (noting that, in Elstad, the Court “re-
jected the . . . fruits doctrine for analyzing the admissibility of a subsequent warned con-
fession following ‘an initial failure . . . to administer the warnings required by Miranda’” 
(quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300)). 
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ing unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”25 Justice Kennedy 
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he acknowl-
edged that the plurality’s opinion “envisions an objective inquiry 
from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both in-
tentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations.”26 However, he 
reasoned that a “narrower test” should apply where, in subjective bad 
faith, an officer employs a two-step interrogation technique to frus-
trate Miranda’s purpose.27 Thus, Kennedy would have realized a sub-
jective bad-faith exception, outside of which Elstad would control.28 
 Conversely, Justices O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, as explained in O’Connor’s dissent, would find Elstad con-
trolling.29 Consequently, within the context of a two-step interroga-
tion procedure, under the dissent’s view a post-warning statement 
would be suppressed only where a defendant established that the 
statement was involuntary.30 
 Because Seibert is a plurality decision, its future implications are 
debatable. At minimum, it is clear that a post-warning confession 
will be suppressed if, as in Seibert, the police acted in a deliberate 
manner in order to undermine Miranda.31 Conversely, it is equally 
clear that a police officer will deny any strategy or intent to pur-
posely withhold Miranda during interrogation. Thus, Seibert prohib-
its an intentional two-step interrogation process; however, lower 
courts may employ the plurality’s test to determine whether the in-
terrogation strategy undermines Miranda. 
FLORIDA RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT—FLORIDA SUPREME 
COURT HOLDS THAT A GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW MAY NOT IMPOSE 
A BURDEN UPON A GENUINELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEF—Warner v. 
City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004). 
 In response to the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith,32 the United States Congress, in 1993, 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).33 Prior to 
Smith, the Court had adopted a rule that any law of general applica-
bility which substantially burdens an individual’s religious practices 
                                                                                                                    
 25. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 27. Id.  
 28. See id.  
 29. Id. (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissent-
ing). 
 30. Id. at 2619; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 31. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 33. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 
2000bb-4 (2000)). 
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would violate the Free Exercise Clause34 if the law was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.35 In Smith, 
however, the Court found that only narrow exceptions permit the ap-
plication of strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability.36 
Smith turned decades of free exercise precedent upside down and, in 
the minds of many religious freedom advocates, was a potential vac-
uum to the right of free exercise of religion.37 
 Attempting to cure Smith and appease the litany of religious free-
dom advocates, Congress passed the RFRA to restore the compelling 
interest test.38 But RFRA’s relief was merely temporary as the Court 
declared it unconstitutional just four years later in City of Boerne v. 
Flores.39 In Boerne, the Court found the RFRA unconstitutional as 
applied to the states40 because it exceeded its enforcement and reme-
dial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Follow-
ing this setback, religious freedom advocates took their cause directly 
to state legislatures.  
 In response to these advocates and their concerns, Florida, in 
1998, passed its own version of the federal RFRA: the Florida Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA).42 Similar to the RFRA, the 
Florida version intended to reestablish the pre-Smith compelling in-
terest test.43 According to the FRFRA, the government may only sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if it can demonstrate 
that the application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a 
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering this interest.44  
                                                                                                                    
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 35. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (stating that a “state 
may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means 
of achieving some compelling state interest.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (re-
jecting the use of the rational basis standard when evaluating religious freedom claims).  
 36. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-84. The Smith Court specifically stated that “[w]e have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an oth-
erwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” Id.  
 37. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(“The Smith decision was met with widespread disapproval by those who viewed the deci-
sion as a departure from settled free exercise jurisprudence and as a dramatic curtailment 
of religious freedom.”).  
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1).  
 39. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 40. Id. at 536. RFRA may or may not be constitutional as applied to the federal gov-
ernment. See Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 175 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 41. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.  
 42. FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-05 (2004).  
 43. See id. § 761.03(1)(a).  
 44. Id. § 761.03(1). Specifically, the FRFRA, in pertinent part, provides: 
(1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of relig-
ion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that 
government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: 
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 In Warner v. City of Boca Raton,45 the Florida Supreme Court ad-
dressed two distinct, unanswered FRFRA-related questions: (1) 
whether the FRFRA broadens—and, if so, to what extent it broad-
ens—the protection afforded to the free exercise of religious activity 
by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court; and (2) whether 
a City of Boca Raton ordinance—prohibiting vertical grave markers, 
memorials, monuments, and structures on its cemetery plots—
violates the FRFRA.46  
 The dispute in Warner involved a cemetery that the City of Boca 
Raton (the “City”) owned, operated, and maintained for its residents. 
In November 1982, the City adopted a regulation prohibiting vertical 
grave markers, memorials, and monuments and other structures (col-
lectively referred to as “grave decorations”) on its cemetery plots.47 
Later, in 1996, the City amended the regulation “to permit some ver-
tical grave decorations up to sixty days from the date of burial and on 
certain holidays.”48 The appellants were plot owners who decorated 
the graves of their family members and loved ones with standing 
statues, crosses, stars of David, and other vertical grave decorations 
between 1984 and 1996 in violation of the regulation.49 They were 
given an ultimatum: if they did not comply with the regulation by 
January 15, 1998, the City would remove all of the noncomplying 
decorations.50 Subsequently, the appellants brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida al-
leging, among other constitutional claims, that the regulation vio-
lated the FRFRA.  
 Judge Kenneth L. Ryskamp of the district court found that the 
prohibition of vertical grave decorations on cemetery plots did not 
violate the FRFRA.51 The court found that, while marking graves 
with religious symbols constitutes a practice of appellants’ religious 
traditions, the particular practice of using vertical grave decorations 
reflects a “matter of purely personal preference regarding religious 
exercise,” which is not protected by the FRFRA.52 Hence, the court 
determined that the regulation did not violate the FRFRA because it 
did not substantially burden appellants’ practice of religion.53 The 
                                                                                                                    
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 45. 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004). 
 46. Id. at 1024.  
 47. Id. at 1025  
 48. Id. 
 49. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 1999).  
 50. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1025. 
 51. See Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.  
 52. Id. at 1283-84.  
 53. See id. at 1288-89.  
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appellants appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit, which certi-
fied the aforementioned two questions to the Florida Supreme 
Court.54  
 As to the first question, the Florida Supreme Court found that the 
protection afforded to the free exercise of religion under the FRFRA 
is broader than that afforded by the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the FRFRA “reinstates the Court’s pre-
Smith holdings by applying the compelling interest test to neutral 
laws of general applica[bility].”55 This standard, however, does not 
support the proposition that any act motivated by religion is subject 
to the compelling state interest test; rather, the only government 
regulations subject to the compelling interest standard are those that 
“substantially burden” an individual’s exercise of religion.56 Although 
there are several definitions of “substantial burden” at the federal 
level with regard to the RFRA,57 the court adopted the narrowest ver-
sion.58 This definition, endorsed by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, provides that a substantial burden on the free exercise of re-
ligion exists where a law “either compels the religious adherent to 
engage in conduct that his religion forbids or forbids him to engage in 
conduct that his religion requires.”59 In other words, a compelling in-
terest inquiry is applicable whether or not the substantial burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability; thus, the court held that the 
FRFRA broadens the free exercise rights afforded by previous United 
States Supreme Court decisions.  
 The court’s narrow definition of what creates a substantial burden 
on the free exercise of religion raises common, yet enigmatic, Estab-
lishment Clause issues.60 The United States Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly stated that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of 
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”61 Thus, courts 
should not be “required to interpret and weigh religious doctrine to 
                                                                                                                    
 54. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033; see supra text accompanying note 46.  
 55. Id. at 1032. 
 56. Id. at 1033.  
 57. There are several definitions, ranging from broad to narrow, of what is a substan-
tial burden on the free exercise of religion available at the federal level. The broadest defi-
nition, adopted by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, provides that an individual is substan-
tially burdened where a law “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s] conduct or expression 
that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual beliefs.” Werner v. McCotter, 
49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 58. See Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033-34.  
 59. Id. at 1033. 
 60. The First Amendment, which in part provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” prohibits 
the government from passing legislation to establish an official religion or preferring one 
religion over another. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 61. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).  
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determine the centrality of a particular practice to a religious tradi-
tion.”62 But in order to apply the Florida Supreme Court’s substantial 
burden element of the FRFRA analysis in Warner, courts are left to 
determine whether a law “compels the religious adherent to engage 
in conduct that his religion forbids . . . or forbids him to engage in 
conduct that his religion requires.”63 If an act is required or forbidden 
by a religion, it could be said that that act is central to the religion. 
In other words, courts will have to determine whether a particular 
practice is central to a religious tradition despite the United States 
Supreme Court’s warning “that courts must not presume to deter-
mine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of 
a religious claim.”64  
 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida, recognizing this potential Establishment Clause problem, at-
tempted to take a middle ground when analyzing FRFRA claims by 
limiting a court’s inquiry only to whether “the practice in question re-
flect[s] some tenet, custom or practice of a larger system of religious 
beliefs.”65 But by adopting the narrow definition of substantial bur-
den, the Florida Supreme Court has arguably created the “risk of 
courts taking sides in religious controversies” because courts must 
determine whether a burdened belief is central to one’s religion.66 Ar-
guably, if courts apply the Warner substantial burden standard to 
FRFRA claims, plaintiffs who believe in and practice traditional re-
ligions with established history—especially with widely recognized 
written texts, such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—are likely to 
receive favorable treatment because these plaintiffs will face a less 
difficult task of showing what the religion requires or forbids; and on 
the other hand, litigants who practice lesser known religions without 
a widely recognized text will arguably face a more difficult task in 
meeting this high burden. This standard, in essence, may implicitly 
endorse those who practice mainstream religions over practitioners of 
minority, nontraditional religions.  
 Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of what con-
stitutes a substantial burden is inconsistent with the explicit lan-
guage of the FRFRA. The FRFRA defines the “exercise of religion” as 
“an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious 
belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central 
to a larger system of religious belief.”67 But in finding that a litigant’s 
free exercise right has been substantially burdened solely when a law 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 63. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033.  
 64. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).  
 65. Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.  
 66. See id. 
 67. FLA. STAT. § 761.02(3) (2004) (emphasis added).  
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forbids a required practice or requires a forbidden practice, it appears 
the court has endorsed a standard whereby only exercises that are 
“central to a larger system of beliefs” are protected under the FRFRA. 
The court’s adoption of such a narrow definition appears to conflict 
with the Florida Legislature’s intent “to expand the scope of protec-
tion afforded to religious practices.”68 
 In answering the second certified question—whether the City 
regulation violates FRFRA—the Florida Supreme Court applied the 
substantial burden analysis and found that the regulation did not 
violate the FRFRA.69 The court, in holding for the City, outlined the 
general framework for all future FRFRA claims. First, “the plaintiff 
bears the initial burden of showing that a regulation constitutes a 
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.”70 If the 
plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to demonstrate “that the regulation furthers a compelling 
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering 
that interest.”71  
 The court did not find it necessary to discuss the compelling gov-
ernmental interest and the least restrictive means analysis because 
it found that the City’s regulation did not substantially burden the 
appellants’ free exercise of religion, and therefore did not violate the 
FRFRA.72 A fact the court found significant in concluding there was 
no FRFRA violation was that the regulation permitted vertical grave 
decorations for sixty days following the date of burial and for a lim-
                                                                                                                    
 68. Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.   
 69. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).  
 70. Id. at 1034 (citing FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)). Many FRFRA cases will likely be dis-
missed because of this initial element of the analysis, due to the court’s adoption of the 
narrow definition of what constitutes a substantial burden. See supra notes 55-64 and ac-
companying text.  
 In setting forth the FRFRA analysis, however, the court has arguably taken a step back 
from its narrow definition of substantial burden set forth earlier in its opinion because the 
court states that the first step requires that plaintiffs “demonstrate that the government has 
placed a substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief.” Id. (empha-
sis added). But the Southern District Court’s definition of a sincere religious belief is a less 
stringent standard than the Florida Supreme Court’s; the Southern District’s definition of a 
sincere religious belief is the equivalent of a “tenet, custom, or practice of the religious tradi-
tion.” Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. However, this standard conflicts with the Florida Su-
preme Court definition of a sincere religious belief, which entails practices that a religion re-
quires or forbids. See Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033. Thus, the plaintiff’s initial requirement of 
showing a substantial burden on the individual’s exercise of religion is a broader, more plain-
tiff-friendly standard under the Southern District’s interpretation of FRFRA. But whether 
the Florida Supreme Court endorses its narrow standard and inadvertently used the South-
ern District’s language or genuinely meant to adopt a broader standard is unclear. It should 
also be noted that if the Florida Supreme Court did, in fact, adopt the Southern District’s 
broader language, it arguably corrects the potential Establishment Clause problems that 
could arise from the narrow interpretation. See supra notes 55-66. 
 71. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1034 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 761.03(1)(a), (b)).  
 72. Id. at 1035. 
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ited period around certain holidays.73 Therefore, the court found that 
the regulation—restricting the manner in which grave decorations 
may be displayed—“merely inconvenience[d] the [appellants’] prac-
tices of marking graves and decorating them with religious symbols” 
and did not substantially burden the appellants’ free exercise of relig-
ion.74  
WORKER’S COMPENSATION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT 
THE “UNRELATED WORKS” EXCEPTION TO THE WORKER’S 
COMPENSATION STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN EMPLOYEES ACT IN 
FURTHERANCE OF THE EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS—Taylor v. School 
Board of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). 
 A primary function, if not the primary function, of the Supreme 
Court of Florida is to develop articulable and well-reasoned principles 
of decisional law that will guide lower courts, lawyers, citizens, and 
agencies.75 For example, when a statute is ambiguous, the court 
should interpret it in a manner that gives lower courts a framework 
to achieve consistent and proper results when the issue again sur-
faces.76 In Taylor v. School Board of Brevard County,77 the Supreme 
Court of Florida failed to perform this function when construing the 
“unrelated works” exception to immunity under the Florida worker’s 
compensation scheme.78 Not only did the court decline to adopt any 
parameters to guide lower courts, but it simultaneously failed to fol-
low a basic tenet of statutory interpretation—that a “statute should 
be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord mean-
ing and harmony to all of its parts.”79 
                                                                                                                    
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Howard A. Levine, The Regulation of Foreign-Educated Lawyers in New York: 
The Past, Present, and Future of New York’s Role in the Regulation of the International 
Practice of Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631, 633 (2003); Daniel J. Meador, Afterword, 15 
J.L. & POL. 567, 570 (1999). 
 76. See Meador, supra note 75, at 570; see also Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 
2d 303 (Fla. 2004) (urging the Legislature to revisit a statute containing neither defined 
critical terms nor standards set for ascertaining compliance); State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d 
1205, 1210 (Fla. 2003) (“As the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, ‘one of our primary 
judicial functions is to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions.’” (quoting Locke v. 
Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1992))). 
 77. 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). 
 78. Id. at 6 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only). The “unrelated works” exception to 
the general worker’s compensation scheme, which provides that the worker’s compensation 
statute is the employee’s exclusive remedy in an injury action against his employer, is as 
follows:  “[S]uch immunities [shall not] be applicable to employees of the same employer 
when each is operating in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are assigned 
primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment.”  FLA. STAT. § 440.11 
(2004). 
 79. State ex rel. City of Casselberry v. Mager, 356 So. 2d 267, 269 n.5 (Fla. 1978). 
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 Florida has a comprehensive worker’s compensation scheme that 
provides injured workers with benefits without proof of fault while, 
at the same time, insulating employers from tort claims.80 Section 
440.11(1),81 however, permits an injured worker to bring claims 
against an employer for negligent acts of coworkers “when each is op-
erating in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are as-
signed primarily to unrelated works within private or public em-
ployment.”82 The Taylor court concluded that this exception should 
apply only when a claimant clearly demonstrates that the negligent 
actions of a fellow employee who has engaged in tasks unrelated to 
the duties of the claimant caused the injury.83 Under the court’s 
analysis, the exception will likely never be applicable. Moreover, 
lower courts were not given the direction needed to determine if the 
facts of a particular case warrant the exception. 
 In deciding Taylor, the Florida Supreme Court was presented with 
the opportunity to resolve a conflict between the Fifth District 
Court’s decision in Taylor84 and the Second District Court’s decision 
in Lopez v. Vilches.85 In Taylor, the petitioner was a school bus atten-
dant who was injured when a wheelchair lift fell on him because his 
co-employee negligently repaired the lift four months earlier.86 Taylor 
filed suit against the school board, arguing that the board was not 
entitled to immunity because he and the mechanics were involved in 
unrelated work.87 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the board, and the Fifth District affirmed because Taylor and the 
mechanics worked out of the same facility and both had responsibili-
ties regarding the wheelchair lift.88 
 The underlying facts in Lopez were similar. Lopez, a van driver for 
a funeral home, was injured due to the negligence of those who main-
tained the van.89 The Second District reversed the trial court’s entry 
of summary judgment against Lopez, holding that “[t]he physical lo-
cation of [the co-employees’] work appears to be separate and their 
                                                                                                                    
 80. See Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 2. 
 81. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1). 
 82. Id.; see also Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 3. Judge Lewis, in his concurrence, more clearly 
explained that section 440.11(1) grants an injured employee the right to sue a negligent co-
employee, but does not permit the employee to prosecute the action due to section 
768.28(9)(a). Id. at 7 (Lewis, J., concurring in the result only). Thus, in Holmes County 
School Board v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1995), the court held that the employee could 
recover from the employer as a surrogate defendant based on the negligent acts of a co-
employee, id. at 1179. 
 83. 888 So. 2d at 52. 
 84. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 790 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), ap-
proved by 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). 
 85. 734 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). 
 86. 790 So. 2d at 1156-57. 
 87. Id. at 1157. 
 88. Id. at 1157-58. 
 89. Lopez, 734 So. 2d at 1096. 
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specific purpose, general funeral home duties versus vehicle mainte-
nance, appear distinct.”90 The Florida Supreme Court approved of the 
Fifth District’s decision in Taylor and disapproved of the Second Dis-
trict’s decision in Lopez, holding that both employees shared a “com-
mon goal” of safely transporting students to school.91 
 The majority and  concurring opinions both focus on determining 
whether the co-employees’ tasks were “unrelated works,” but they ig-
nore the preceding clause of the statute which clarifies, to some ex-
tent, the scope and context in which the Florida Legislature intended 
the unrelated works exception to be viewed. The clause provides an 
exception to employer immunity “when each [co-employee] is operat-
ing in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are assigned 
primarily to unrelated works . . . .”92 Thus, looking at Taylor, the 
school board’s business is the education of children. The court sum-
marily held the works not unrelated because all co-employees shared 
a common goal of safe transportation. Giving credence to the preced-
ing clause of section 440.11(1), the inquiry should have been whether, 
within the business of educating children, driving as opposed to 
maintaining a school bus is an unrelated work.93 Undoubtedly, the 
court made the correct decision. However, by not giving effect to the 
clause preceding the unrelated works clause—the “operating in the 
furtherance of the employer’s business”94 clause—the court encour-
ages lower courts to disregard it. Failure to recognize the clause per-
mits lower courts to make decisions against the plain language of the 
statute and the Legislature’s intent.95 
 A case in point is the Third District’s decision in Dade County 
School Board v. Laing.96 In Laing, a teacher was leaving class when 
he was struck by a golf cart driven by a school custodian.97 The court 
granted immunity to the school board, holding that the works were 
not unrelated because the court found both employees were involved 
                                                                                                                    
 90. Id. at 1097. 
 91. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).  
 92. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2004) (emphasis added). 
 93. The ambiguity of the unrelated works exception is clarified, at least as to the 
proper scope of the inquiry, by the complete statutory scheme. See Jones v. ETS of New Or-
leans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2001) (“Accordingly, ‘statutory phrases are not to be 
read in isolation, but rather within the context of the entire section.’” (quoting Acosta v. 
Richter, 671 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 1996))); accord Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 
(1993) (“Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a 
statute.”). 
 94. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1). 
 95. The Legislature intended that the worker’s compensation statute should not be 
interpreted liberally in favor of either party—the employer or the employee. See id. As dis-
cussed infra, Florida courts interpret the exception in favor of the employer. See infra 
notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
 96. 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). 
 97. Id. at 20. 
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in promoting education.98 This analysis is specifically prohibited by a 
plain reading of the statute. The school board’s business is promoting 
education. Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether teaching and 
custodial duties are unrelated works within the scope of promoting 
education. Common sense dictates that they are. In a later case, San-
chez v. Dade County School Board, the Third District upheld the 
Laing decision, holding that a teacher and a security guard were not 
engaged in unrelated works.99  
 Two other cases provide further examples of lower courts reading 
out the “in the furtherance of the employer’s business” clause. In 
Vause v. Bay Medical Center,100 the First District examined a situa-
tion where a nurse, primarily practicing in a hospital’s obstetric de-
partment, died due to her co-employees’ improper operation—in an-
other department—of a hyperbaric machine.101 The court used broad 
language in holding that neither the nurse, operator, nor a hospital 
administrator were engaged in unrelated works because all were in-
volved in “[t]he provision of health care to patients of the medical 
center.”102 The holding may be correct as to the machine operator be-
cause, reading the situation as section 440.11(1) mandates, in the 
business of providing health care, the nurse and the operator were 
involved in the work of caring for a specific patient.103 However, as to 
the administrator, in the business of providing health care, nursing 
and administration are undoubtedly unrelated works.104 Likewise, 
the Fourth District in Fitzgerald v. South Broward Hospital District 
held that surgical nurses and maintenance personnel were not in-
volved in unrelated works.105  
 These decisions all hold that when employees are acting in fur-
therance of the employer’s business, the employer is immune—a con-
tention against the plain language of the statute. The Florida Su-
preme Court’s failure to construe the statute as it is written will sim-
ply misguide lower courts in making their decisions; moreover, it 
erodes the unrelated works exception. Every employee is acting, in 
one form or another, in the furtherance of her employer’s business.106 
                                                                                                                    
 98. Id. 
 99. 784 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
 100. 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). 
 101. Id. at 260. 
 102. Id. at 263. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Judge Lewis pointed this out in his Taylor concurrence, stating that “the adminis-
trator of the hospital should not likewise enjoy immunity from suit because his work is un-
related to that of the nurse.” Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1, 15 (Fla. 
2004) (Lewis, J., concurring in the result only). 
 105. 840 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 106. Oddly, the Taylor court recognized this fact when it noted that “in one sense, all 
employees of the same employer could always be considered engaged in related works since 
they are all charged to carry out the mission of the employer.” Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 5. Even 
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By ignoring the statutory language and the legislature’s intent, the 
unrelated works exception will likely never apply.107 
 Judge Lewis concurred in the result only.108 His analysis focuses 
on the fact that the court “fail[ed] to adopt any parameters to provide 
assistance to the lower courts in the application of the unrelated 
works exception found in section 440.11(1).”109 Judge Lewis’s analysis 
supports the argument that lower court decisions have interpreted 
the statute in a manner that eviscerates the exception.110 However, 
he conducted a survey of tests used by lower courts to determine 
whether co-employee works were unrelated.111 
 Judge Lewis determined that the question whether works are un-
related should be analyzed under a combination of two tests—the 
physical business location test and the same project-business purpose 
test.112 Four situations illustrate Judge Lewis’s vision. First, where 
co-employees are not assigned tasks at the same physical business lo-
cation and the work is not part of the same project, the exception is 
inapplicable as a matter of law.113 Second, where the employees are 
not working at the same physical business location but are directed 
to perform tasks where an injury occurs and the work performed is 
part of the same business project with co-employees, the exception is 
inapplicable as a matter of law in regard to other co-employees in-
volved in the project.114 Third, where co-employees are assigned tasks 
at the same physical business location and the tasks are part of the 
same project, the exception is inapplicable as a matter of law.115 Fi-
nally, when co-employees are assigned tasks at the same physical 
business location where an injury results but the tasks are not part 
of the same business project, the unrelated works exception applies 
as a matter of law.116 
                                                                                                                    
with this admission, the court failed to give effect to every clause in section 440.11(1). The 
question the statute requires is whether, within that mission, the works are unrelated. 
 107. While not explicitly stating that courts were reading out part of the statute, Judge 
Lewis’ concurrence noted that the “interpretation [given by these courts] would render all 
hospital and similar employees [as being] engaged in the same ‘mission,’ and the unrelated 
works exception would, therefore, never be applicable.” Id. at 12 (Lewis, J., concurring in 
the result only). 
 108. Id. at 6. 
 109. Id.
 
 110. Id. at 11 (stating that the Vause “decision contains language which describes a 
project far too broadly” and that the Third District definition of “project” would make it dif-
ficult to have a situation where any school employees could ever be engaged in unrelated 
works). See also supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 111. Id. at 8-14. 
 112. Id. at 14. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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 This framework should be utilized by lower courts when determin-
ing whether works are unrelated—at least Judge Lewis’s concurrence 
attempts to fulfill the court’s primary function of guiding lower 
courts, lawyers, citizens, and agencies. However, this framework 
should only be applied after recognizing the scope mandated by sec-
tion 440.11(1). For now, the Taylor decision has denied lower courts 
both the proper scope and framework to determine whether the unre-
lated works exception applies. Maybe, as suggested by Judge Lewis, 
“the best solution would be for the Legislature itself to amend the 
statute to define ‘unrelated works’ or provide more specific word-
ing.”117 
TORTS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE FLORIDA 
HIGHWAY PATROL DOES NOT HAVE A COMMON LAW DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN FLORIDA’S HIGHWAYS—Pollock v. Florida Department of 
Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004). 
 Florida has waived sovereign immunity from liability in tort ac-
tions “for any act for which a private person under similar circum-
stances would be held liable.”118 Therefore, “there can be no govern-
mental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care ex-
isted that would have been applicable to an individual under similar 
circumstances.”119 If no duty of care is owed, then the question of gov-
ernmental liability need not be reached.120 Conversely, if a duty of 
care exists, then it must be determined if sovereign immunity bars 
an action for a breach of this duty.121 This judgment necessitates a 
determination of the character of the alleged negligent governmental 
act or omission.122 In Pollock v. Florida Department of Highway Pa-
trol, the Florida Supreme Court explained that “basic judgmental or 
discretionary governmental functions are immune from legal action, 
whereas operational acts are not protected by sovereign immunity.”123 
The Pollock court addressed both the issue of sovereign immunity 
and the issue whether the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) owed a 
duty of care to maintain Florida’s highways. The tragic facts of Pol-
lock may, at first, cause an individual to disagree with the court for 
not compensating the plaintiff. Yet, as this Note will conclude, the 
court’s decision was clearly correct from a legal standpoint.  
                                                                                                                    
 117. Id. at 13. 
 118. Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1999).  
 119. Id. at 535.  
 120. See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that the question 
of immunity does not arise unless the defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plain-
tiff).  
 121. See Henderson, 737 So. 2d at 535.  
 122. See Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2004). 
 123. Id. 
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 Early in the morning on September 5, 1993, Suzanne Leeds and 
Elissa Pollock were traveling on the Palmetto Expressway.124 They 
were killed instantly when their vehicle collided into the back of a 
stalled tractor-trailer.125 An hour earlier, Raul Pedrero nearly hit the 
recently abandoned tractor-trailer while traveling home on the Pal-
metto Expressway.126 Pedrero subsequently exited the expressway 
and went to a gas station where he phoned 911.127 His call was trans-
ferred to the FHP; Pedrero informed the dispatcher of the stalled, 
unlit tractor-trailer on the Palmetto Expressway.128 He was informed 
that an officer would be sent to the scene.129 FHP’s dispatcher, how-
ever, failed to enter the call into the computer for assignment.130 As a 
result, no officer was sent to the scene and the tractor-trailer re-
mained stalled and unlit on the Palmetto Expressway as Suzanne 
Leeds and Elissa Pollock approached.131 
 The families of the deceased brought tort actions against the FHP 
for failing to safely maintain the expressway.132 At the time of the in-
cident, FHP had internal operating rules requiring it to dispatch a 
trooper to the scene of stalled vehicles; moreover, officers were avail-
able that morning to answer the call had it gone out.133 Additionally, 
Rule 12.00.00 of the FHP Communication Policy/Procedures Manual, 
entitled “Crash Prevention,” provides as follows: “Crash prevention 
and crash investigation are the primary functions of the Florida 
Highway Patrol and the duty officer’s role in these endeavors are of 
major importance. Strict adherence to this chapter will enable every 
officer to handle these responsibilities in an efficient and professional 
manner.”134  
 At trial, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs.135 On appeal, 
the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and di-
rected that final judgment be entered in favor of the FHP.136 The 
                                                                                                                    
 124. State v. Pollack, 745 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) quashed sub nom. by Pol-
lock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004). The Florida Supreme Court 
spelled the party’s name as “Pollock” rather than following the district court’s spelling be-
cause “[t]he parties . . . consistently refer[red] to the personal representative and the de-
ceased as ‘Pollock’” during the supreme court’s proceedings. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 930 n.2. 
 125. Pollack, 745 So. 2d at 447. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 448. Originally, the Pollock and Leeds actions were brought separately; 
however, the Leeds action was subsequently transferred to the circuit court where the Pol-
lock’s case was pending, and the two cases were consolidated for trial. Id.  
 133. Id. at 447. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 448. 
 136. Id. at 451.  
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Third District held that there was no indication that FHP’s inaction 
was operational in nature and that FHP owed no special duty to the 
decedents as a matter of law.137 The court also certified a conflict with 
Hoover v. Polk County Sheriff’s Department138 and Cook v. Sheriff of 
Collier County,139 despite finding these cases distinguishable from a 
procedural standpoint from the case at issue.140 
 In Pollock, the petitioners argued to the Florida Supreme Court 
that there was a duty of care on the part of FHP based on two sepa-
rate sources. First, they claimed that as the governmental entity 
charged with patrolling the state’s highways, the FHP has a duty to 
maintain those highways in a safe condition, to warn of dangers, and 
to correct dangerous conditions.141 Second, they argued that FHP’s 
policies and procedures manual created a duty to dispatch an officer 
to the scene of a stalled vehicle.142 The Florida Supreme Court re-
jected both these arguments. This Note will discuss the rationale for 
each rejection in turn.  
 The court began its analysis by noting that “[i]t is well settled that 
a public or private entity which owns, operates, or controls a prop-
erty, including a roadway, owes a duty to maintain that property, 
and a corresponding duty to warn of and correct dangerous condi-
tions thereon.”143 The court concluded, however, that this theory did 
not apply in Pollock because FHP had no ownership of, or control 
over, Florida’s highways.144 Moreover, the court noted that under the 
statutory scheme at the time of the accident, the responsibility for 
the maintenance of the roads belonged to the Florida Department of 
Transportation and local governments.145 Additionally, FHP’s ena-
bling statute did not afford the agency ownership or control over 
Florida’s highways.146 The court held that the statutory language 
made it permissive, rather than mandatory, for the FHP to respond 
to stalled vehicles on Florida’s highways.147  
 The court further stated that controlling the flow of traffic and en-
forcing the traffic laws are duties the FHP owes to the general public 
                                                                                                                    
 137. Id. at 450. 
 138. 611 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), disapproved in part by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).  
 139. 573 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), disapproved in part by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).   
 140. Pollack, 745 So. 2d at 450-51.  
 141. Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2004).  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 934. 
 145. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 335.04(2) (1993) (repealed 1995).  
 146. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934; see also FLA. STAT. § 316.194(3)(a) (1993).  
 147. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934. 
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rather than to an individual person.148 According to the court, a duty 
to enforce laws for the good of the public at large cannot create a duty 
to act with care toward a specific individual, “unless an official as-
sumes a special duty with regard to that person.”149  
 A special duty does exist when law enforcement officials become 
directly involved in circumstances that place people in a “zone of 
risk.”150 The court explained that where police officers have not ar-
rived at the scene or taken control over the situation, the “zone of 
risk” analysis is not applicable.151 Thus, FHP could not be held liable 
on such a theory.  
 The court further noted that a special duty can arise when a police 
officer makes a direct representation to a plaintiff that he or she will 
take a specific law enforcement action.152 Relying on Dario v. Roth,153 
the court found this theory to be inapplicable in the present case. In 
Dario, a dispatcher in a sheriff’s office had informed a caller that the 
sheriff’s office would respond to reports of a loose deer.154 The sheriff 
failed to respond; later, a motorist was injured in an automobile colli-
sion with the deer.155 On these facts the Third District Court of Ap-
peal held that the sheriff did not owe a duty to the subsequent motor-
ist.156 The Pollock court explained that,  
[l]ike the defendant in Dario, FHP did not, by word or deed, create 
a duty of care toward the decedents over and above its general 
duty to enforce the state’s traffic laws. Thus, FHP owed no duty of 
care to the decedents to respond to the emergency call regarding 
the stalled tractor-trailer.157 
 The court then addressed the petitioners’ claim that the FHP’s in-
ternal operating procedures manual created a duty for FHP to dis-
patch officers to the scene of stalled vehicles. The court held that the 
FHP’s internal operating policies and procedures created no such 
duty:  
While a written policy or manual may be instructive in determin-
ing whether the alleged tortfeasor acted negligently in fulfilling an 
                                                                                                                    
 148. Id. at 935 (citing Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 
921-22 (Fla. 1985)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 935-36. 
 152. Id. at 936.  
 153. 756 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).  
 154. Id. at 263. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 265. 
 157. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 936. 
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independently established duty of care, it does not itself establish 
such a legal duty vis-à-vis individual members of the public.158 
In sum, the court held that FHP had no special duty either to main-
tain the road on which the accident occurred or to dispatch an officer 
to the scene of the stalled vehicle.  
 Finding that FHP did not have a common law duty determined 
the outcome of the case, thereby making moot the issue whether FHP 
was shielded by sovereign immunity. However, the court addressed 
the issue in order to clarify potential confusion caused by the district 
court opinion.159 Regarding the issue of sovereign immunity, the dis-
trict court made this statement: “Based upon the foregoing we find 
that FHP’s actions or inactions were not operational in nature and 
that no special duty was owed to decedents so as to constitute a 
waiver of sovereign immunity.”160 The supreme court addressed the 
district court’s statement as follows: 
We believe the foregoing excerpt could be interpreted as conflating 
the duty and sovereign immunity analyses. The district court’s 
opinion should not be interpreted as holding that governmental 
tort liability attaches as a matter of law in the absence of a statu-
tory or common law duty if the activity in question is operational 
in nature. Such a conclusion would contravene fundamental and 
oft-repeated principles of duty and the law of sovereign immunity. 
Furthermore, we specifically refuse the petitioners’ invitation to 
alter the law of sovereign immunity to provide that if a govern-
mental act is operational in nature, then there automatically ex-
ists a duty of care to all persons injured by the act or omission.161 
 Justices Pariente and Quince dissented from the majority opinion. 
The gravamen of the dissent was that FHP gratuitously undertook to 
maintain Florida’s highways and assumed the duty to respond to the 
stalled tractor-trailer “when the dispatcher assured Mr. Pedrero that 
he would ‘send a unit to check it out.’”162 The dissent further con-
cluded that FHP’s ministerial duty of logging the calls into the sys-
tem was an operational-level activity, not a governmental planning 
function, and thus sovereign immunity was subject to the statutory 
waiver in this situation.163 Conspicuously absent from the dissent is 
any discussion of Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,164 which 
arguably supports Justice Pariente’s position. 
                                                                                                                    
 158. Id. at 937. 
 159. Id. at 938. 
 160. State v. Pollack, 745 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), quashed sub nom. by Pol-
lock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004). 
 161. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 938 (citation omitted).  
 162. Id. at 942 (Pariente, J., dissenting).  
 163. Id. at 942-43. 
 164. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).  
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 The Clay Electric case involved a tragic accident in the early 
morning darkness on September 4, 1997, when a fourteen-year-old 
boy was struck and killed by an automobile in an area where a 
streetlight was inoperative.165 The issue in the case was whether the 
electric company owed the plaintiff a legal duty to use reasonable 
care in maintaining the streetlight.166 The court held that the electric 
company owed the plaintiff a duty based upon the so-called “under-
taker’s doctrine”:  
Whenever one undertakes to provide a service to others, whether 
one does so gratuitously or by contract, the individual who under-
takes to provide the service—i.e., the “undertaker”—thereby as-
sumes a duty to act carefully and to not put others at an undue 
risk of harm. [This maxim] applies to both governmental and non-
governmental entities.167 
 The dissent in Pollock makes the identical argument but fails to 
mention Clay Electric. The likely reason for this is that Clay Electric 
is clearly distinguishable from Pollock. In Clay Electric, the electric 
company provided power to the streetlight in question; they had be-
gun to act gratuitously with respect to the streetlight and thus had 
an obligation to continue to maintain it. Conversely, in Pollock, FHP 
did not begin acting gratuitously with respect to the stalled tractor-
trailer. Had FHP begun to act, and the accident occurred, the FHP 
potentially could have been found to have assumed a duty of care un-
der the “undertaker’s doctrine” and the zone of risk theory.168 The fact 
remains, however, that FHP did not begin to act; therefore, FHP did 
not assume a duty of care as to the plaintiffs. Had the dissent men-
tioned Clay Electric, it would have served only to undermine an al-
ready weak argument.  
 The majority opinion might be viewed as going against an accept-
able human reaction, namely to punish FHP for a horrible tragedy. 
Yet the fact remains that FHP had no legal duty to the decedents. 
Under these facts the Florida Supreme Court was correct to rule in 
accordance with settled legal principles.169 
                                                                                                                    
 165. Id. at 1184. 
 166. Id. at 1185. 
 167. Id. at 1186. 
 168. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
 169. The court clearly recognized these competing interests:  
We in no way condone FHP’s failure to take prompt action when it was alerted to 
the potential danger caused by the stalled tractor-trailer. However, under settled 
principles of Florida law, having not responded to the scene to become directly in-
volved in the roadway circumstances, FHP had no legally recognized particular tort 
duty which would generate or impose governmental tort liability with regard to re-
sponding to the scene, the issuance of warnings of the potential danger, or provision 
for the removal of the tractor-trailer under the circumstances presented in this case. 
Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 938.  
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GOOD SAMARITAN ACT—THE 2004 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE EXTENDS 
THE GOOD SAMARITAN ACT TO PROTECT FROM CIVIL LIABILITY 
PERSONS PROVIDING EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES IN 
CONNECTION WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES—FLA. STAT. 
§ 718.13 (2004). 
 With the reality of terrorism to deal with, legislatures have been 
forced to confront the startling prospect of disaster management. The 
aftermath of an emergency can be disorderly and require the help of 
undertrained and inexperienced individuals, many of whom are vol-
unteers. The possibility of accidents occurring during an emergency 
situation is not insignificant, and the prospect of tort liability is 
heightened due to the participation of hastily trained disaster relief 
personnel—such potential liability could undermine emergency aid 
efforts before the efforts begin. Recognizing the instrumental role in-
dividual workers and volunteers play in recovering from an emer-
gency and the undermining effect tort liability could have on such ef-
forts, the 2004 Florida Legislature extended the Good Samaritan 
Act170 to protect emergency workers acting in concert with local, 
state, and federal relief efforts.171 However, whether the amendment 
will have any real effect is an open question.172  
 A Good Samaritan law protects from civil liability a person who 
gives assistance during an emergency.173 Good Samaritan statutes re-
flect a preference that persons capable of assisting those in need pro-
vide aid rather than refrain from acting due to fear of liability—that 
is, the overall social good provided by assistance in emergencies out-
weighs the harm caused by negligent assistance in emergencies, and 
therefore assistance should not be discouraged by subjecting the as-
sistor to a civil suit.174 A majority of jurisdictions protect all assistors 
while a minority of jurisdictions protect only those trained to provide 
medical assistance.175 Those jurisdictions only extending protection to 
medical providers in emergency situations do so by not holding them 
                                                                                                                    
 170. FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2004). 
 171. See Act effective May 12, 2004, ch. 2004-45, 2004 Fla. Laws 406 (codified at FLA. 
STAT. § 768.13(2)(d)). 
 172. See infra notes 185-87, and accompanying text.  
 173. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 252 (2001).  
 174. See id.; see also Justin T. King, Comment, Criminal Law:  “Am I My Brother’s 
Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. 
REV. 613, 622 (1999) (observing that Good Samaritan laws “encourage good deeds”). A 
critic of Good Samaritan laws might observe that if society desires to encourage volunteer-
ism, it should not do so at the expense of the negligently injured. That is, if society derives 
an overall benefit from increased volunteerism, then society should compensate the victim. 
 175. Bridget A. Burke, Using Good Samaritan Acts to Provide Access to Health Care for 
the Poor: A Modest Proposal, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139, 140 (1992). 
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to the usual professional standard;176 rather, medical providers are 
subject to a lower standard.177 
 Prior to the 2004 amendment, Florida was among the jurisdictions 
with a Good Samaritan statute directed only to medical providers. 
Florida’s act protected three classes of potential defendants: those 
who “gratuitously and in good faith render[] emergency care or 
treatment” in response to a declared emergency or at the scene of an 
emergency outside a doctor’s office or hospital;178 health care provid-
ers, including hospitals, supplying emergency services;179 and any 
health care practitioner who is in a hospital who attends to a patient 
“with whom at that time the practitioner does not have a then-
existing health care patient-practitioner relationship, and when such 
care or treatment is necessitated by a sudden or unexpected situation 
or by an occurrence that demands immediate medical attention.”180 
 The 2004 amendment181 to the Good Samaritan Act created an-
other protected class in addition to those supplying medical relief. 
This class includes any person participating in “emergency response 
activities under the direction of or in connection with . . . local emer-
gency management agencies, [state agencies], or the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency.”182 This class enjoys broader protection 
from civil damages than the other classes—in addition to immunity 
from damages as a result of care or treatment, this class is also im-
                                                                                                                    
 176. E.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, § 242, at 631-32 (“[T]he patient normally under-
stands and expects that physicians acting within the ambit of their professional work will 
exercise the skill, knowledge, and care normally possessed and exercised by other members 
of their profession . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (2004) (exempting from liability in an emer-
gency any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who acts “as an ordinary 
reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances”). 
As Professor Dobbs observes, the suits that Good Samaritan statutes protect against are 
“practically non-existent,” since the standard of care for a physician acting in an emer-
gency would take into account the unusual circumstances of the emergency. 1 DOBBS, su-
pra note 173, § 252, at 664; see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Health Care Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 
1113, 1121 (2002) (noting that, though most states have a Good Samaritan law, “there are 
very few reported opinions under them”). Although Good Samaritan laws have been de-
scribed as “legislative placebos,” there is still plausibly some value in the placebo effect. 
See Burke, supra note 175, at 141 (“Since these laws served to assuage physicians’ fears of 
liability, and because they seemed to encourage positive behavior, they were not objection-
able.”). However, true to Dobbs’ and Mayo’s criticisms, a Westlaw search reveals just six 
reported opinions arising from Florida’s Good Samaritan Act in its nearly forty years of ex-
istence. 
 178. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (2003). 
 179. Id. § 768.13(2)(b)(1). 
 180. Id. § 768.13(2)(c)(1). 
 181. Act effective May 12, 2004, ch. 2004-45, 2004 Fla. Laws 406 (codified at FLA. STAT. 
§ 768.13(2)(d) (2004)). 
 182. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(d) (2004). 
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mune as a result of “services.”183 However, immunity is only extended 
if a person acts as a “reasonably prudent person would have acted 
under the same or similar circumstances.”184 
 The addition to the Good Samaritan Act creates at least three 
questions for its interpretation and its ultimate effect: (1) the breadth 
of the phrase “in connection with” the emergency response actions of 
an agency,185 (2) the scope of the word “services,”186 and (3) the actual 
effect of the amendment, as it immunizes “reasonably prudent per-
sons” from liability, which is the same standard for a negligence 
claim.187 The amendment is plainly directed at increasing volunteer-
ism in the aftermath of a disaster;188 however, considering the possi-
ble varying constructions of the phrases “services” and “in connection 
with,” it is not clear how much protection the Legislature intended to 
provide volunteers. Moreover, the litigation that could define these 
terms may be sparse due to the unchanged standard of care.  
 Taken at face value, the amended Good Samaritan Act seems a 
prescient effort by the Legislature in light of the hurricanes that rav-
aged Florida in 2004 and the accompanying relief efforts. The hurri-
canes may supply the backdrop for the definition of the amendment’s 
ambiguous terms as civil defendants attempt to defend tort suits via 
the Good Samaritan Act. On the other hand, the standard of care im-
plemented by the amendment—that of a “reasonably prudent per-
                                                                                                                    
 183. Id. Section (2)(a) of the Good Samaritan Act, which extends immunity to persons 
not acting in conjunction with an agency, only supplies immunity from civil damages for 
those rendering “emergency care or treatment.” Id. § 768.13(2)(a). 
 184. Id. § 768.13(2)(d). 
 185. For instance, what level of formality is required to satisfy “in connection with”? 
Does the person have to complete paperwork? Contact an agency official or employee? Or 
merely assist others in the same general area as an agency’s emergency response effort? 
Neither the statute nor the staff report supplies guidance as to the construction of the 
phrase.  
 186. “Services” can also be interpreted broadly. There seems to be little that would not 
arguably be a service during a disaster—repairs to property, answering telephones, dis-
tributing food, and so on. Again, the statute and the staff report supply little guidance—
the staff report merely acknowledges that immunity for “services” is broader than the im-
munity provided by the rest of the statute. See Fla. S. Comm. on Comp. Plan. & S. Comm. 
on Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care, CS for CS for SB 532 (2004) Staff Analysis 4 (Mar. 8, 
2004) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Comp. Plan. & Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care 
Staff Analysis] (stating that the amendment “provides immunity from liability to a person 
who provides ‘services’ during emergency response activities, in addition to medical treat-
ment”).  
 187. See, e.g., De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 1952) (“Negligence is 
the failure . . . to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done un-
der the circumstances . . . .”). This legislation is vulnerable to the same criticism that is 
levied at Good Samaritan statutes in general—the protection that is provided to the assis-
tors by statute would also be provided under the usual standard of care. See 1 DOBBS, su-
pra note 173, § 252. 
 188. See Comp. Plan. & Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care Staff Analysis, supra note 
186, at 5 (“The immunity available . . . may encourage people to volunteer to assist gov-
ernment emergency management agencies during emergencies.”). 
2005]                          RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 997 
 
son”189—is the same as is required of an ordinary defendant in a tort 
suit and provides no additional protection to the Good Samaritan; as 
such, defendants who actually use the Good Samaritan defense may 
be sparse. If this is the result, it would seem that the Legislature has 
created a placebo190—the amendment may provide some comfort to 
volunteers and thus encourage their participation, but it is devoid of 
effect with regard to their liability for accidents that result from their 
participation. 
IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY—THE 2004 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE 
IMMUNIZES FROM CIVIL LIABILITY MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS OF 
FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND 
WRONGFUL DEATH THAT RESULTS FROM LONG-TERM CONSUMPTION OF 
SUCH FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES—FLA. STAT. § 768.37 
(2004). 
 From time to time, a tort lawsuit enters the public consciousness 
and engenders such debate191 as to force lawmakers to reconsider as-
pects of the tort system. The central question posed in this discussion 
is, To what length should the law go to protect fools?192 In 2003, one 
lawsuit garnered such attention from the popular media—Pelman v. 
McDonald’s Corp., a New York personal injury class action suit 
against McDonald’s, which came about as a result of a child’s illness 
associated with long-term consumption of fast food.193 Although the 
case was ultimately dismissed,194 the audacity of the suit—
essentially, a suit against a manufacturer of known unhealthy foods 
that seeks damages for the predictable result of consuming un-
healthy foods—and the potential injury to the food service industry 
as a result of such suits has forced political consideration of the topic 
in state legislatures.195  
                                                                                                                    
 189. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(d). 
 190. See supra note 177. 
 191. For example, in an infamous products liability suit against McDonald’s, a jury 
awarded a $2.9 million verdict to a plaintiff who burned herself when she spilled McDon-
ald’s coffee upon herself. See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that a 
Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1. The verdict sparked 
national headlines and criticism. See id. 
 192. E.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“If a 
person knows or should know that eating copious orders of supersized McDonalds’ products 
is unhealthy and may result in weight gain . . . , it is not the place of the law to protect 
them from their own excesses.”). 
 193. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
 194. Id. at 543 (dismissing the suit for failing to demonstrate a hidden dangerous con-
dition regarding the food in question and, with respect to the negligence claim, dismissing 
for want of duty). 
 195. Some considered a legislative cure particularly necessary due to the perception 
that the fast-food industry would become the next great stomping ground of the plaintiff’s 
bar in the wake of successful, widespread tobacco litigation. See Jason L. Riley, Salivating 
over Fast-Food Torts, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at A16. On March 10, 2004, the United 
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 The 2004 Florida Legislature took preemptive action on the is-
sue.196 The Legislature passed House Bill 333,197 aimed squarely at 
preventing suits like Pelman.198 In relevant portion, the enacted stat-
ute provides:  
No manufacturer, distributor, or seller of foods or nonalcoholic 
beverages . . . shall be subject to civil liability . . . to the extent 
such liability is premised upon a person’s weight gain or obe-
sity . . . resulting from the person’s long-term consumption of such 
foods or nonalcoholic beverages.199 
Further, the statute defines “long-term” as “the cumulative effect of 
multiple instances over a period of time and not the effect of a single 
or isolated instance.”200 Finally, the statute provides that it does not 
apply where the seller has not provided information regarding nutri-
tional content, as required by Federal law, or where the information 
provided is false or misleading.201 
 Although this statute is clear in purpose and effect, there is none-
theless some question as to whether it was necessary. To date, none 
of the suits against the fast-food industry for the long-term effects of 
consuming fast food have succeeded;202 moreover, a Florida court had 
yet to consider the issue.203 The test for whether a defendant owes the 
plaintiff a common law duty in Florida is whether the plaintiff is in 
the “foreseeable zone of risk” created by the defendant’s conduct.204 
This doctrine, as a general matter, errs on the side of caution in al-
                                                                                                                    
States House of Representatives passed a reform that would prohibit such suits, see Per-
sonal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); how-
ever, to date the Act has not passed the Senate. Additionally, the suit caused the fast food 
industry to rethink its practices. McDonald’s, the original target, began offering healthier 
menu options. See, e.g., Steven Gray, McDonald’s Feels the Heat and Offers Some Healthier 
Fare, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at A11. 
 196. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 333 (2004) Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 2, 2004) 
(on file with comm.) [hereinafter Judiciary Staff Analysis] (stating that Florida courts have 
not addressed the issue). 
 197. See Act effective May 21, 2004, ch. 2004-88, 2004 Fla. Laws 579 (codified at FLA. 
STAT. § 768.37 (2004)).  
 198. See Judiciary Staff Analysis, supra note 196, at 2.  
 199. FLA. STAT. § 768.37 (2004). 
 200. Id. The definition of “long-term” is well reasoned, as it prevents a covered entity 
from using this statute as a defense in the case of a traditional products liability case, 
wherein some condition (aside from the adverse cumulative health effect of consumption) 
causes injury to a plaintiff. 
 201. Id. One of the premises of the holding in Pelman was the everyday knowledge of 
the relative healthfulness, or lack thereof, of the food at issue. See Pelman v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is well-known that fast food in general, 
and McDonalds’ products in particular, contain high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and 
sugar, and that such attributes are bad for one.”). The Florida statute assumes such 
knowledge exists so long as the nutritional information is available and accurate. 
 202. See Gray, supra note 195. 
 203. See Judiciary Staff Analysis, supra note 196, at 2.  
 204. See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502-04 (Fla. 1992). 
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lowing claims to clear the judicial screening function of duty in order 
to ensure potentially worthy claims are heard by the jury.205 As such, 
it would appear that a well-pleaded argument, to the effect that a 
fast-food consumer was foreseeably placed at risk by the fast-food in-
dustry owed to the unhealthy nature of the food produced by the in-
dustry, would have survived a motion to dismiss prior to the instant 
legislation.206 Due to the potential that a Florida tort claim against a 
food manufacturer would reach the jury, the instant legislation is an 
effective implementation of the Legislature’s goal.  
                                                                                                                    
 205. See William N. Drake, Jr., Foreseeable Zone of Risk: Confusing Foreseeability with 
Duty in Florida Negligence Law, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2004, at 10, 12 (arguing that, in tort cases 
since McCain, the Florida Supreme Court “invariably has found a duty to exist”). 
 206. A doctrine that is logically useful is diminished duty for a risk-taking plaintiff, or 
“comparative negligence.” See 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, §§ 201-02. Under this theory, the 
health risk of the plaintiff’s ingestion of fast food is an open and obvious danger, and the 
plaintiff is said to have assumed the risk of eating the food. Id. However, this doctrine is an 
affirmative defense and therefore forces the defendant to endure trial and persuade the 
jury; furthermore, Florida is a pure comparative negligence state. Id. § 202. This means 
that a jury could find the defendant partially negligent as compared to the plaintiff’s 
fault—say, twenty-five percent to the plaintiff’s seventy-five percent—and still allow the 
plaintiff to recover. See id. The legislative civil immunity absolves defendants of the bur-
den and risk of a jury trial.   
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